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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS - RE-
QUIREMENTS OF A "FULL HEARING".-In 1930, the Secretary of
Agriculture initiated an inquiry as to the reasonableness of the existing
rates charged by market agencies at the Kansas City stockyards.'
The order fixing the maximum rates subsequently followed. The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of this order on two
grounds: (1) that it was made without the "full hearing" required by
the statute; (2) that it was arbitrary and illegal, depriving them of
their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.2 The District
Court dismissed the bills of complaint. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, held, reversed and remanded.3 Upon the rehearing, the Dis-
trict Court held that the hearing before the Secretary was adequate
and his order lawful. The plaintiff again appealed to the Supreme
Court on the question of whether a "full hearing" had been granted.4
The Supreme Court again reversed. The hearings were fatally de-
fective in that the one who heard the evidence was not the one who
decided the rates. The defendants were not afforded sufficient oppor-
tunity to become acquainted with the contentions of the Government,
and were therefore unable to adequately advance a defense. Morgan
v. United States, - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 773 (1938).
A proceeding which results in the fixing of rates of a market
agency is of a legislative character, having, in addition, the special
attributes of a quasi-judicial tribunal.5 It is a proceeding by virtue
of the authority conferred by Congress and must comply with the
standards and limitations which Congress has prescribed. 6 In dele-
gating to the Secretary of Agriculture the exercise of the extraordi-
nary powers granted by the Packers and Stockyards Act, Congress
explicitly expressed the requirement that his action depend upon a
1 PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS AcT, 42 STAT. 159, 7 U. S. C. A. § 217 (1921).
2U. S. CoNsT. Amend. V: "* * * nor (shall any person) be deprived of
** * property, without due process of law; * * *.".
'Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936) ; Morgan
v. United States, - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 773, 775-776 (1938).
'Appellant alleged that the Government did not submit a brief, formulate
issues, furnish appellant with statements of its proposed findings, or prepare a
tentative report to be submitted as a basis for exceptions and argument, and
that the findings were prepared by the Bureau of Animal Industry and adopted
by the Secretary after an ex parte consultation with his subordinates and
appellant had no opportunity to examine the findings until served with the order.
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 227
U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185 (1913); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Garrett, 231
U. S. 298, 34 Sup. Ct. 48 (1913); Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468,
56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 88,
56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936).
6Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936).
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"full hearing" 7 and unless such a hearing is granted, the order is
void.8
The requirement of a "full hearing" has reference to the tradi-
tion of judicial proceedings and is to be interpreted with regard to
judicial standards, not in a narrow, technical sense, but with respect
to the fundamental requirements 9 guaranteed by the Constitution
which are of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial
nature.'0 The "inexorable safeguard" which the due process clause
assures is that the trier of facts shall be an impartial tribunal, that no
finding shall be made except upon actual or constructive notice 11 and
opportunity to be heard, that there be evidence adequate to support
pertinent and necessary findings of fact, that nothing be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such, that facts and circumstances
which ought to be considered must not be excluded, that findings based
on facts must embrace the basic facts which are needed to sustain the
order,'1 2 that the procedure be conducted in such a way that there be
an opportunity for a court to determine whether applicable rules of
procedure were observed.' 3 The right to a hearing embraces not
T42 STAT. 166 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 211 (1934) provides, "Whenever after
full hearing * * * the Secretary is of the opinion that any rate *** is or will
be unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory-
(a) May determine and prescribe what will be a just and reasonable
rate or charge, * * *".
' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 227
U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185 (1913); United States v. Abeline & Southern Ry.,
265 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct 565 (1924); Florida v. United States, 282 U. S.
194, 51 Sup. Ct. 119 (1931); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 293
U. S. 454, 55 Sup. Ct. 268 (1935).
'Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936) ; Morgan
v. United States, - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 773 (1938).
Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railway Commission, 289 U. S.
287, 53 Sup. Ct. 637 (1933); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
(No. 1), 294 U. S. 79, 55 Sup. Ct. 316 (1935) ; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, (No. 2), 294 U. S. 79, 55 Sup. Ct. 332 (1935) ; St. Joseph
Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720 (1936); Ohio
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 57 Sup. Ct.
724 (1937) ; Railway Commission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.,
302 U. S. 388, 58 Sup. Ct. 338 (1938).
'Tagg Bros. and Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 433, 50 Sup.
Ct. 220, -, (1930) held that a notice from the Secretary of Agriculture inform-
ing market agencies of a hearing * * * to inquire into the reasonableness of a
new schedule of rates, * * * and appraising them that they would have the
"right to appear and show cause why a further order in respect to said schedule
of rates and charges should not be made * * *" was sufficient to put such
respondents on notice that rates lower than those in either the proposed or
existing schedules might be fixed by the Secretary under 306 (e), and
310, * * *. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936);
Railway Commission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 302 U. S.
388, 58 Sup. Ct. 334 (1938).
" Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936).
" Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 32 Sup. Ct. 734 (1912);
United States v. Abeline & Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565
(1924) ; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 734 (1931) ; West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, (No. 1), 294 U. S. 63, 55 Sup.
19381
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only the right to present evidence but to know the claims of the op-
posing party and to be given an opportunity to meet them.' 4 The
hearing is the hearing of evidence and argument, and the one who de-
cides is bound in good conscience to be guided by that alone and to
reach his conclusions uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. If
the one who determines the facts which underlie the order has not con-
sidered the evidence or argument, it is obvious that a hearing has not
been granted.15 However, a mere error in formal procedure will not
invalidate an order, 16 but such an order must be set aside if it rests
upon an erroneous rule of law or is based upon a finding made with-
out evidence or upon evidence which clearly does not support it.17
It is manifest that the court intends that in an administrative pro-
ceeding of a quasi-judicial nature, the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of a fair
trial."' It does not intend to lay down a hard and fast rule concerning
Ct. 316 (1935) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 56
Sup. Ct. 720 (1936) ; Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 Sup. Ct. 906(1936).
1" Railway Commission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 302
U. S. 388, 58 Sup. Ct. 338 (1938).
' Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481, 56 Sup. Ct. 906 (1936).
"The weight ascribed to the findings rests upon the assumption that the officer
who makes the findings has addressed himself to the evidence and upon that
evidence has conscientiously reached the conclusions which he deems it tojustify. *** It is a duty akin to that of a judge. The one who decides must
hear."
1"National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.,
- U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 913 (1938) held that the respondent had not been
denied a "full hearing" even though there was a technical discrepancy in the
wording of the summons, complaint and findings, and the trial examiner failed
to prepare an intermediate report. "Oral argument was had and brief filed
with the Board after which it made its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The respondent now asserts that the failure of the Board to follow its
usual practice of the submission of a tentative report by the trial examiner and
a hearing on exceptions to that report deprived the respondents of opportunity
to call to the Board's attention the fatal variance between the allegations of the
complaint and the Board's findings. What we have said sufficiently indicates
that the issues and contentions of the parties were clearly defined and as no
other detriment or disadvantage is claimed to have ensued from the Board's
procedure, the matter is not one calling for reversal of the order. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial,
rights." Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct.
220 (1930).
17 "The inquiry of a board of the character of the Interstate Commerce
Commission should not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to
the admissibility of proof. Its function is largely one of investigation and it
should not be hampered in making inquiry pertaining to interstate commerce by
those narrow rules which prevail in trials at common law where a strict corre-
spondence is required between allegations and proof." Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 Sup. Ct. 563 (1904).
" "Although administrative action is repugnant to American tradition and
principle, still such action has received the sanction of the courts. It is true
that administrative control has gone too far, as in the matter of the regulation
of the issuance of corporate securities. On the other hand it has not gone far
enough in other fields. Administrative control, due to our congested civilization,
[ VOL.. 13
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the procedure but indicates that substance rather than form shall pre-
vail. Each case will stand or fall upon its own merits and the deter-
mining factor will be whether a full hearing in a substantial sense
has been granted.
R. M. T.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT-POLICE POWER.-In defiance of a city ordinance 1
prohibiting the distribution of literature of any kind within the city
limits without first obtaining the prescribed permission, Alma Lovell
circulated certain religious magazines and pamphlets.2 She was ar-
rested and her conviction was upheld in the highest court in her state.3
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The
ordinance is unconstitutional as abridging the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.4 Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
It would seem obvious that the ordinance under consideration-
"that the practice of distributing * * * literature * * * of any kind
without first obtaining written permission from the city manager * * *
shall be * * * punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin,"-
is an unwarranted encroachment upon the guaranteed freedom of the
press.5 Yet, surprisingly enough, although a person cannot ordinarily
,be restrained from publishing literature of any kind, such restraint has
frequently been exercised by a strained extension of the doctrine of
is here to stay. There is one bright star left shining for the objectors. Admin-
istrative control is quasi-judicial, and in time it will become 'truly judicial in
attitude, atmosphere, and spirit'." Dickinson, The Fear of Bureaucracy (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 597.
"'That the practice of distributing * ** circulars, handbooks, advertising,
or literature of any kind, * * *, within the city limits of the City of Griffin,
without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City
of Griffin, * * * shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense
against the City of Griffin." Instant case, p. 667.
2 The magazine and pamphlet, called the "Golden Age", set forth the gospel
of the "Kingdom of Jehovah". No permit was applied for because defendant
regarded herself as sent "by Jehovah to do His work," and that such an appli-
cation would have been "an act of disobedience to His commandment".
'55 Ga. App. 609, 191 S. E. 152 (1937).
'(a) U. S. CoNsT. Amend. I. "Congress shall make no law *** abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press; * * *."
(b) U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV. "* * * No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privilege or immunities of citizens of the
United States; * * *."
'See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462, 27 Sup. Ct. 556, 558
(1907) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 630 (1931) ;
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245, 56 Sup. Ct. 444, 447(1936).
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